Precedent and the Semblance of Law Book Review Symposium: Settled versus Right: A Theory of Precedent by Sachs, Stephen E.




Precedent and the Semblance of Law Book Review
Symposium: Settled versus Right: A Theory of
Precedent
Stephen E. Sachs
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sachs, Stephen E., "Precedent and the Semblance of Law Book Review Symposium: Settled versus Right: A Theory of Precedent"
(2018). Constitutional Commentary. 1185.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1185
5 - SACHS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/6/18 10:56 AM 
 
417 
PRECEDENT AND THE SEMBLANCE  
OF LAW 
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF 
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.1 Cambridge University 
Press. 2017. PP. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper). 
Stephen E. Sachs2 
Americans disagree about the Constitution. Often they 
disagree deeply. The Supreme Court sometimes purports to 
“resolve [an] intensely divisive controversy,” calling both sides 
“to end their national division”—but it rarely succeeds.3 Five-four 
majorities shift with the political winds, whether on abortion, the 
death penalty, or campaign finance.4 At the level of theory, the 
disagreement is just as bad: different Justices deploy different 
arguments from originalism, pragmatism, common-law 
constitutionalism, or other approaches still more exotic or 
idiosyncratic (assuming they draw on any theories at all). Justice 
Scalia once suggested that his colleagues didn’t even agree “on 
the basic question of what we think we’re doing when we interpret 
the Constitution.”5 If the leaders of American law are so torn on 
these questions, are we sure that there really are right answers? 
Does America truly have any constitutional law? 
 
 1. Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. 
 2. Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. © Stephen E. Sachs 2018. The 
author is grateful for comments from William Baude, Randy Kozel, Amanda Schwoerke, 
and the attendees of the Settled Versus Right Book Talk at the University of Richmond, as 
well as for the excellent research assistance of Patrick Butler and Adam Griffin. 
 3. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 4.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (overruling Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914 (2000)) (abortion); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling Stanford 
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)) (death penalty); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) (overruling McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)) (campaign finance). 
 5.  Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/. 
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Into this divided world comes Randy Kozel’s Settled Versus 
Right. Like its author, the book is insightful, thoughtful, and kind; 
it’s deeply committed both to describing and to improving the 
world that it sees. Its argument and approach are worth thinking 
deeply about, even for—indeed, especially for—those who might 
disagree with its conclusions. But despite its upbeat tone, the book 
paints rather a dark picture of current law and the current Court. 
It depicts a society whose judges are, in a positive sense, lawless—
not because they disregard the law, but because they are without 
law, because they have no shared law to guide them. What they 
do share is an institution, a Court, whose commands are generally 
accepted as law by lower courts (and, at least sometimes, by the 
Justices themselves). 
So Settled Versus Right makes the best of what we’ve got. 
Instead of a legal system that shifts with each new appointment, it 
seeks a body of precedent that’s stable and impersonal (p. 11), the 
way law ought to be. It hopes to reorient judicial culture around a 
“second-best” stare decisis (pp. 100-103): one that deliberately 
enforces precedents that are “badly reasoned”6 or “flagran[tly]” 
wrong, so as to avoid reopening our disagreements on interpretive 
method or theory (pp. 103-104). If we can’t agree on rules of law, 
or on the theories that ought to generate these rules, at least we 
can compromise on preserving whatever our legal institutions 
have done before. 
Though this compromise is well-argued, it may fail to satisfy 
both sides. On the one hand, if we do still have some 
constitutional law, this law may take a view on our rules of stare 
decisis—a view that might not be the same as Kozel’s. The second-
best theory is openly revisionary, rather than merely trying to 
capture our existing legal practice (including our practice of 
precedent). Without a firm grounding in existing law, its pursuit 
of stability and impersonality may yield a system that’s more 
lawlike than lawful. It may be a mere semblance of law, the way 
Kant saw “love of honor and outward propriety” as mere 
“semblances of morality,”7 sharing only an obedience to “strict 
laws of conduct for their own sake.”8 On the other hand, if our 
 
 6. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009). 
 7. IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, in 
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 29, 36 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Publ’g 
Co. 1983) (1784). 
 8.  CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 57 (1996). 
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disagreements really have deprived us of any real law to apply—
leaving judges to advance their values as best they can—then 
there are many other important values to consider, beyond 
maintaining the system’s lawlike nature through stable and 
impersonal rules. A judge might wish to use her office to protect 
the environment, prevent violent crime, and so on; the second-
best theory can’t tell us where stability and impersonality rank on 
that list. 
Perhaps there’s another way forward. Rather than patching 
up a broken system, we might use Kozel’s analysis to illuminate 
ways of deepening our existing areas of agreement on rules and 
theories of law. In this project, stare decisis might aid us, if we see 
it as a fallback and not as a foundation-stone. Precedent often 
serves as a provisional doctrine, supplying us with stand-in 
answers when we’re unsure of the real ones—requiring us to act 
as if a court has decided a case correctly, but not necessarily to 
treat the court’s decision as itself establishing the standard of 
correctness.9 Perhaps precedent is supposed to be a mere 
semblance; perhaps that’s its proper role, letting us debate the 
contours of our actual law without requiring a thousand judicial 
flip-flops along the way. If so, then expanding our agreement on 
the law might indeed involve a cultural change, but of a somewhat 
different sort. We ought to take the law rather more seriously, and 
courts and judges rather less so. Once we do, we might find that 
our world is a lot less lawless than we think. 
I 
The problem with “[t]he prevailing approach to precedent,” 
Kozel writes, is that it presumes “a greater degree of agreement 
about constitutional theory than actually exists” (p. 6). Our legal 
system features “pervasive disagreement over constitutional 
interpretation,” without “anything approaching consensus” as to 
“the proper method” (p. 6). This disagreement is often 
“principled” (p. 17): the disputants are reasonable people arguing 
in good faith, and we can’t show (on shared standards) that one 
side is obviously correct. But even if we could, it wouldn’t help. 
The combination of legal disagreements, party alignments, 
multimember courts, and staggered appointments means that our 
 
 9. See Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2019) 
(manuscript at 41–43), http://ssrn.com/id=3064443 [hereinafter Sachs, Finding Law]. 
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system will inevitably be “characterized by interpretive 
pluralism” (p. 98). 
The unfortunate result is that our constitutional practice will 
“vacillat[e]” along with “changes in judicial personnel” (p. 18). 
Whether, say, Citizens United v. FEC10 “remains the law of the 
land” will turn on whether new appointments make “the four-
justice dissent into a five-justice majority,” even as “the 
Constitution itself will not have changed a bit” (p. 5). In what 
Kozel describes as “the worst-case scenario”—a scenario that 
seems not so far off—the very “ideal of constitutional law as stable 
and enduring” might “give way to the notion that judicial identity 
and legal meaning are one and the same,” and that the law is 
whatever judges say it is (p. 99). 
In its extreme form, this disagreement could undermine the 
case that there is any constitutional law on the matters in dispute. 
The judges who write concurrences and dissents seem to think 
they’re making legal arguments, and that some of their arguments 
are right—that one side’s answer is legally better than the other’s. 
But how is this possible? On the most commonly accepted 
account of law, what makes a legal rule valid—or a legal answer 
good—is the actual practice of Americans and their attitudes 
thereto.11 If Americans are so fundamentally divided that they 
lack any unified legal practice, then how can one side have the 
right of the argument legally, and not just prudentially or morally? 
This is what Matthew Adler calls “The Puzzle”: on the 
“contested questions” of constitutional theory, are there any 
“legally correct answers”?12 If there’s some deep consensus at 
work, why don’t we see more evidence of it in practice?13 And if 
there isn’t one, why do judges act like they’re disagreeing about 
the law (say, “[w]hether there really is a federal power to regulate 
marijuana”), when their disagreement itself shows the questions 
at issue to be “legally indeterminate”?14 As Adler asks, “[w]hat 
would it take for one side in this debate to be correct and the other 
incorrect? How is that even possible given the very fact of 
 
 10. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 11.  Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 
1221–22 (2009). 
 12.  Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2012). 
 13.  See id. at 1131. 
 14.  Id. at 1135. 
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debate?”15 This, in turn, poses what he calls “the ‘Meta-Puzzle’: 
Why has the Puzzle failed to bother constitutional theorists? . . . 
Why have theorists not spent more time reflecting upon the status 
of the arguments they are making?”16 
One way to explain all this disagreement is to explain it away, 
as a giant mistake—to adopt an “error theory” of constitutional 
law.17 On almost all legal questions, Brian Leiter notes, American 
society displays “massive and pervasive agreement”: most 
disputes stay out of court, most filed cases never reach trial, and 
so on.18 For these disagreements, there really are right legal 
answers, grounded in the shared practices of the American legal 
community. But, Leiter argues, there are also some deep 
questions on which “the practice of officials breaks down, and the 
‘law’ is up for grabs.”19 To the error theorist, studying such 
questions is like studying astrology or the Loch Ness monster: the 
field is useless, because its subject doesn’t really exist.20 But when 
judges proceed to address these questions, they don’t always 
notice that the ground has run out from underneath them. Misled 
by their experience of agreement elsewhere, they keep right on 
going, as if legal answers to the deep questions are still out there.21 
So long as the judges don’t look down, they can keep running, 
Wile-E.-Coyote-like, over empty air. 
Kozel’s response to these alleged gaps in the law is to start 
building bridges. Whatever the right answers might be—if there 
are any—we can at least find the answers that courts gave in the 
past. Enforcing those answers today, through an enhanced 
doctrine of precedent, makes the practice of American law more 
stable over time, and it prevents the results in constitutional cases 
from varying with the personalities of the individual judges 
deciding them. 
At the same time, Kozel would shape the enforcement of past 
precedent to present circumstances. For stare decisis to “make 
good on its promise” (p. 103), it has to be made safe for pluralism. 
 
 15.  Id. at 1136. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See Leiter, supra note 11, at 1224. 
 18.  Id. at 1227. 
 19.  Id. at 1228. 
 20.  See Richard Joyce, Moral Anti-Realism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win
2016/entries/moral-anti-realism/#ErrThe. 
 21.  See Leiter, supra note 11, at 1232. 
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We need a doctrine that’s immune to “disputes over interpretive 
philosophy” and capable of “transcend[ing] methodological 
disputes” (pp. 103, 129). That means “limiting or excluding” any 
features of stare decisis that might depend “on methodological 
and normative commitments that vary from judge to judge” (p. 
107). Some traditional features of the doctrine, like “procedural 
workability, factual accuracy, and reliance expectations,” can be 
applied just as well “by judges across the methodological 
spectrum” (p. 103). Yet others, like “jurisprudential coherence, 
flagrancy of error, and a precedent’s perceived harmfulness,” 
inevitably vary with a judge’s legal commitments and will have to 
be dropped (p. 104). 
This may not be the best doctrine of stare decisis, or the one 
we’d choose if we agreed on the legal underpinnings. But a 
second-best theory of stare decisis, Kozel argues, is better shaped 
for the “second-best world” in which we live (p. 100). 
II 
The second-best theory is a reasonable response to a legally 
divided world. But is it a lawful response? “Stare decisis is, at base, 
a legal doctrine” (p. 171): it claims to generate legal reasons, 
telling judges and officials to use their powers in particular ways. 
If a judge is going to decide a case by relying on stare decisis—say, 
imprisoning someone for helping to publish a political book 
within 60 days of an election22—then there needs to be legal 
warrant for that decision. This suggests that the legal system may 
already have rules on point. 
Yet it also presents a dilemma. If there’s already law on point, 
then a second-best theory might be inconsistent with that law. No 
matter how lawlike a theory might be, or how helpful in 
smoothing over disagreements, a judge might still be legally 
forbidden to use it. Alternatively, if there’s no law on point—if 
the use of second-best stare decisis really is an open choice for 
judges—then there might be many other reasons, having nothing 
to do with precedent or courts, for those judges to choose 
differently. Stare decisis can’t “shake off the trappings of 
constitutional theory,” producing a view-from-nowhere “that 
operates independently of any interpretive methodology” (p. 61), 
 
 22.  See 2 U.S.C. §§ 437g, 441b (2006) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30109, 30118); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321, 337–38 (2010). 
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because it needs those trappings to assert a general claim of 
priority over other values. It can’t stand outside the law and act 
with the force of law at the same time. 
A 
Consider the first horn of the dilemma—that we may have 
law on point. Courts sometimes call stare decisis “a principle of 
policy,”23 but they don’t really mean it. (If a Justice were 
convinced that a defendant’s conduct were protected by the First 
Amendment, it’d be no argument that affirming the conviction 
might still prove useful for policy reasons—by promoting 
economic growth, say, or easing the strain on judicial dockets.) 
Instead, stare decisis is treated as a separate legal rule, like laches 
or waiver, that justifies courts in reaching different decisions than 
the merits might otherwise suggest.24 This is particularly visible for 
vertical stare decisis: if a district court disregards the decision of 
its regional court of appeals, that’s treated as a breach of its legal 
obligations, whether or not it has the better argument on the 
merits. 
But if stare decisis is a legal doctrine, then we need to know 
how it fits in with the rest of American law. That ineluctably 
brings up questions of legal theory. For example, some originalists 
reject stare decisis outright: to enforce a precedent is to ignore the 
actual Constitution in favor of what judges have said about it.25 
Other originalists find stare decisis to be a valid consequence of 
their theories, and not what Scalia called a “pragmatic 
exception.”26 Maybe a common-law rule of precedent, to be 
applied when the law is otherwise uncertain (and the past decision 
not “demonstrably erroneous”),27 was part of the “original law” 
of the Founding, which courts must continue to enforce until that 
 
 23. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 
U.S. 106, 119 (1940)). 
 24. See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797, 1832. 
 25.  See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence 
of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005). 
 26.  ANTONIN SCALIA, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 140 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (emphasis omitted). 
 27.  Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2001) [hereinafter Nelson, Stare Decisis]. 
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law is properly changed.28 On either of these accounts, the second-
best theory might be forbidden, as a departure either from the 
Constitution or from the Founders’ law more generally. So any 
complete defense of the lawfulness of second-best stare decisis 
would have to establish that these originalist accounts are wrong. 
(And the same goes for contrary accounts of precedent based on 
other high theories—pragmatism, Ackermanian “constitutional 
moments,” and so on.) 
Kozel describes these “[i]ssues of constitutional legitimacy” 
as “complicated and fascinating,” but he doesn’t “dwell on them,” 
because stare decisis is “uncontroversial in modern judicial 
practice”: not a single Justice “has challenged the lawfulness of 
stare decisis” (p. 9). This is a perfectly respectable positivist 
argument, and it operates at a different level of generality than 
the high-theory arguments discussed above. It suggests that 
American social practice is unified enough to support a law of 
stare decisis, in the same way that it supports a federal tax code or 
state-law property rights—regardless of whether it also supports 
more abstract legal conclusions about originalism, common-law 
constitutionalism, or other issues found at what Leiter calls “the 
pinnacle of the pyramid.”29 
If we do have a law of stare decisis, though, we need to know 
what it says. The book discusses various arguments for the 
lawfulness of stare decisis (pp. 54-59), but these arguments don’t 
necessarily apply to the second-best theory in particular. Instead, 
the doctrine that’s uncontroversial in modern practice is the 
existing one, in which a precedent may sometimes be abandoned 
for being “badly reasoned.”30 That’s why, for example, the book 
describes “the prevailing approach to stare decisis” as still 
“tethering a decision’s continued vitality to the perceived gravity 
of its offenses” (p. 102). That’s also why it argues for “revis[ing] 
the current doctrine” and adopting the second-best theory instead 
(p. 175), limiting our consideration of a precedent’s wrongness to 
truly extraordinary circumstances (pp. 121-123). 
 
 28.  On “original-law originalism” and stare decisis, see Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism 
as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 863–64 (2015); see also 
William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2358–61 (2015); 
Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1863–66 (2012) 
[hereinafter Sachs, Backdrops]. 
 29. Leiter, supra note 11, at 1228. 
 30.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009). 
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So we still need to explain why a judge, bound by our existing 
law of stare decisis, should enforce a precedent that’s not only 
wrong, but (per the existing rules) legally suitable for overruling. 
There may be good reason to revise the rules of precedent, of 
course, just as there’s good reason to revise the tax code. Unless 
those reasons are legal reasons, though, judges might not be 
legally free to act on them. 
B 
One reason to revise the doctrine might be that current law 
is in dispute. Unlike Leiter, Kozel doesn’t advance an error theory 
of constitutional debate: he describes modern interpretive 
disagreements as “principled” (p. 17), suggesting that there still 
remains something real for us to disagree about. But given the 
degree of disagreement we have, no one theory can hope to 
conquer anytime soon, even with truth on its side. “[T]o 
accommodate the reality of interpretive pluralism,” the partisans 
of each theory will have to “mediate their theoretical 
commitments,” saving whatever benefits of their theories can still 
be saved (pp. 170-171). And the most important benefits, the ones 
that make the second-best theory best of all, are the benefits of 
the rule of law. Through its “commitment to continuity and 
impersonality,” stare decisis also “embodies . . . a commitment to 
the rule of law rather than the rule of men and women,” offering 
reliable answers even when men and women disagree (p. 106). 
At one level, this account makes perfect sense. To the extent 
that our “interpretive methodology” rests on “[n]ormative 
commitments” (p. 64), the on-the-ground fact of disagreement 
might change how those normative commitments are best 
satisfied. And whatever reasons one might have for caring about 
the rule of law (as judges plainly do) are reasons for caring about 
stare decisis as well. 
But there are two kinds of reasons in play here: legal reasons 
and reasons to follow the law. Both the rule of law in general and 
our own legal regime in particular confer all kinds of benefits on 
society, which judges as well as other people have reason to 
pursue. But doing what the legal system requires, and doing 
whatever maximizes its benefits under current circumstances, are 
two very different things. Legal systems are human institutions 
and share in human frailty; their aims may be ill-chosen or 
inconsistent, or they may achieve those aims imperfectly. As a 
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result, what one has legal reason to do isn’t always the same as 
what one has good reason to do, even if one usually has good 
reason to follow the law. So long as there really is law to follow, 
many defenses of otherwise-attractive doctrines might be ruled 
out by the very legal system whose values they serve. 
Take, for example, the value of judicial accuracy. A judge 
who’s “realistic about the limits of individual reason” and 
“optimistic about the soundness of collective wisdom” might 
choose to defer to past decisions, in the hopes of increasing her 
percentage of correct decisions over time (p. 57). By choosing 
what seems like the worse result in a specific case, she might better 
satisfy her general obligation “to render decisions according to 
law” (p. 57). Assuming that this is true, though (and that the past 
decisions aren’t systematically unreliable),31 it still presumes that 
the law allows this kind of consequentialism—maximizing law-
adherence over time, rather than respecting the side constraints 
imposed in each individual case. In fact, the law often rules out 
tradeoffs like these. A lone juror in a criminal case, convinced 
within the limits of her own reason that her doubts of guilt are 
reasonable, may be legally required to dissent from her fellow 
jurors and to vote to acquit. This might be true even if 
compromising on a lesser charge would help avoid a retrial and 
likely conviction on the greater charge: the system demands 
individual honesty, not maximal accuracy overall.32 Judges, too, 
might have similar obligations; perhaps they’re charged to vote 
correctly by their own lights, and not to accord more than 
persuasive authority to other judges or other courts. Either way, 
these are system-specific questions that we can’t answer in the 
abstract. They depend on what the law says, and not on what 
would make the judicial system the best it can be. 
The same is true for values advanced by particular 
constitutional theories. Originalism, for example, has been 
defended for reasons ranging from “popular sovereignty” to 
“welfare maximization” to others further afield (p. 66). Perhaps, 
in our fallen world, these values are better advanced by a regime 
 
 31. See generally William Baude & Ryan Doerfler, Arguing with Friends, 117 MICH. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), http://ssrn.com/id=2985032. 
 32.  See COMM. ON FED. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.03, at 
103 (2012), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pattern-jury-instructions/7th_criminal_jury 
_instr.pdf. 
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of super-strong stare decisis—which, like originalism, would 
require judges “to apply predefined, publicly accessible legal 
rules,” and which would restrict future changes to the process of 
Article V (pp. 166-167). But this resemblance turns out to be 
superficial, for anyone committed to originalism as law will not be 
indifferent as to which publicly accessible legal rules get super-
strong enforcement. The law of the Founding and “whatever 
maxes out our normative commitments” aren’t the same thing. 
If interpretive methodology really rested only on normative 
commitments, then it might make sense to determine which 
precedents to overrule by asking normative questions—like “why 
it is important for the law to be correct in the first place” (pp. 64, 
92). But if the correctness of a precedent is a matter of positive 
law, then that question is extremely hard to make sense of—like 
asking why it’s so darn important for chess players to make valid 
moves. An external observer might well ask why judicial accuracy 
is important, or why anyone should care about playing chess the 
usual way; but inside the system, so to speak, there’s no discussing 
it. That chess players just do have to make valid moves is a side 
constraint on “chessical” reasoning, just as deciding cases 
correctly might be a side constraint on American legal reasoning. 
That’s why it matters so much whether precedent can legally 
require what would otherwise be the incorrect disposition—as it 
does for the district judge obliged to follow the Fourth Circuit. 
Maybe a court with absolute discretion to deny certiorari—or, 
indeed, a judge reviewing her daily calendar—might care about 
“which mistakes are in greatest need of correction” (p. 92); but 
it’s precisely because these are extralegal decisions that they can 
rely on such plainly extralegal factors. 
In fact, a legal system does more than advance particular 
values. It advances them in particular ways, with attention to 
means as well as ends.33 Law is a “constructed or ‘artificial’ 
normative system[],”34 one that “screen[s] off from a 
decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would 
otherwise take into account.”35 Deciding which values, including 
 
 33. Cf. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 115–16 
(discussing attention to means in statutory interpretation). 
 34.  Mitchell N. Berman, Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems, in 
DIMENSIONS OF NORMATIVITY: NEW ESSAYS ON METAETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE 
(D. Plunkett et al. eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3), http://ssrn.com/id=3042669. 
 35. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988). 
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rule-of-law values, will be sacrificed to which others “is the very 
essence of legislative choice”—and as was once said of legislative 
intent, it “frustrates rather than effectuates” such aims to assume 
that whatever advances legal values must be the law.36 
Deferring to precedent, by “enhancing continuity and 
avoiding disruption,” might well promote rule-of-law values (p. 
88). But it can’t promote the rule of law unless it’s actually 
consistent with law, unless it would actually help the law to rule. 
And we can’t make that determination so long as we’re officially 
agnostic about what the law requires. Enforcing some other rule 
that isn’t law, but acts like it, is only enforcing law’s semblance—
no closer to real law than honor and propriety are to good morals. 
C 
All this assumes that there’s some law to be had. So what of 
the other horn of the dilemma: what if Leiter’s right, and there 
isn’t really any law on point? 
If judges can’t base their decisions on legal norms, they’ll 
have to use some other set of norms instead. In that case, it helps 
that the book’s case for stare decisis isn’t “value-free,” but 
“unmistakably normative”; its argument “privileges the 
impersonality and continuity of law” as values “accepted by 
judges across the philosophical spectrum” (p. 106). Yet while the 
book is broadly compatible with an error-theory account, actually 
adopting that account might entail a far greater change to our 
practice, greatly weakening any argument for privileging these 
norms in particular. Rule-of-law values aren’t the only values out 
there, and they lose any special claim to prominence as soon as we 
step outside the process of enforcing law. 
Kozel’s isn’t exactly an error-theory account, but error 
theory provides a useful lens for reading it. If our practice is so 
divided that we fail to share any deep norms of constitutional 
law—if our interpretive commitments are nothing more than 
“individual beliefs,” “preferences,” “inclinations,” or 
“predilections” (pp. 11, 16, 105, 130)—then it’s easy to see why 
high theory should be subordinated to other concerns. And if 
there isn’t any law on high-theory questions, then we can easily 
strike these questions from the list of traditional factors (like 
reliance interests or changing facts) that might be relevant to 
 
 36. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987). 
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reconsidering precedent. Suppose that a five-Justice majority 
overrules a Sherman Act case based on its economic views,37 
“empirical observations that do not depend on methodological or 
normative commitments” (p. 111). The abrupt change might be 
disruptive, but at least the Justices’ disagreement is about 
something real, which expert judgment might eventually resolve. 
By contrast, if the same five-Justice majority overrules campaign-
finance cases based on its reading of the First Amendment—well, 
that’s essentially a matter of opinion, based on “criteria that have 
no independent content unless they are situated within a 
particular methodological framework” (p. 110). 
If the methodological debates are fruitless, though, it seems 
odd to describe the ongoing disagreements as “principled” (p. 17), 
rather than “well-meaning but deeply confused.” Recognizing our 
error ought to make it go away. If there’s no real law to apply, 
there’s no point arguing about particular frameworks; we might 
as well argue about the underlying values instead, conducting our 
formerly legal debates in ordinary normative terms. 
And at that point, it’d be necessary to explain why stability 
and impersonality are the only norms that count. Second-best 
stare decisis “implicitly gives less salience to other values” (p. 
135); it considers them only in “exceptional situations” (p. 122), 
as a Scalia-like “pragmatic exception”38 or “safety valve” to keep 
disgruntled judges from bolting (p. 123). In “the ordinary course,” 
the theory chooses to “exclud[e]” consideration of a precedent’s 
“substantive effects,” whether good or bad (p. 121). That choice 
needs more defense once we depart from our familiar practice of 
enforcing preexisting law. 
Stability and impersonality do have a natural connection to 
the rule of law. If you happen to have a legal rule on point, it ought 
to be applied consistently, even at different times or by different 
people. And it’s equally natural for a legal system to care more 
about rule-of-law values like impartial application than about 
other considerations of substance. Law succeeds at “screening 
off” those substantive factors from the decisionmaker precisely 
because it’s an artificial system, one that won’t always line up with 
our actual moral obligations.39 
 
 37. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 38. SCALIA, supra note 26, at 140. 
 39.  Schauer, supra note 35, at 510. 
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If there’s no law on point, though, there’s little reason to 
expect these other factors to stay screened off. The fact that 
stability and impersonality are widely appreciated—that they’re 
something “all judges can recognize” (p. 109)—doesn’t mean that 
they’re the most valuable things to have. Sometimes legal systems 
treat other things as more important: a legislature might prohibit 
“child neglect” through general standards rather than 
hyperspecific proscriptions, making sure to cover the waterfront 
at the cost of tolerating some variance in application.40 Given a 
free hand, judges might similarly advance values that trade off 
with stability or impersonality: establishing justice, preserving 
domestic tranquility, protecting endangered species, lowering tax 
rates, and so on. Without law on point, judges should presumably 
pursue whatever’s actually the best thing to do—with stability and 
impersonality receiving only as much weight as they deserve. 
Even from the standpoint of stability and impersonality, 
adhering to mistaken precedent can carry real substantive costs. 
The prisoner with a valid claim to his freedom may find it cold 
comfort to be “treated consistently with past litigants,” or to learn 
that his prison term may “enhance a court’s credibility, and with 
it the status of the judiciary as a steady, impersonal institution” 
(p. 40). It’s unclear whether courts gain more credibility by 
adhering to past results or by reasoning from grounds (or arriving 
at outcomes) that are themselves broadly perceived as consistent 
with law. And while second-best stare decisis may be a shield 
against future change, it’s also a sword in the hand of any group 
of five current Justices, whose badly reasoned opinions can be 
superseded in the future only by constitutional amendment. In 
practice, the Constitution might then be precisely “what five 
justices say it is” (p. 18)—if not today’s five, then yesterday’s, with 
the entrenched practice turning on which of the Warren or the 
Rehnquist Courts was the first to get its say. The arbitrary 
“preferences and personalities of a particular group of justices 
assembled at a particular moment in time” (p. 42) might then be 
the sole determinant of many constitutional outcomes. 
None of this would matter, legally at least, if second-best 
stare decisis were required by law. But if there’s no law on point, 
judges might well prefer to do something else. 
 
 40. See Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 14, 24–28 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (2005). 
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III 
In our system, precedent may well be merely a semblance of 
law. That sounds like a bad thing, but it isn’t. Law, too, is only a 
semblance. It imposes artificial rules of conduct that sometimes 
(and only sometimes) advance our actual moral goals. Because 
people disagree about the right answers to moral questions, we 
use legal rules to generate fake answers, “on which society 
(mostly) agrees and which allow us (mostly) to get along.”41 In the 
same way, when people disagree about the right answers to legal 
questions, we use devices such as waiver rules, statutes of 
limitations, or doctrines of res judicata or adverse possession to 
generate stand-in answers in place of the real ones. (Whether A 
really owned Blackacre doesn’t matter, so long as B occupied it 
openly and notoriously for a long enough time.) 
Viewing precedent as provisional in this way suggests a 
different response to our deep and persistent disagreement. 
Instead of focusing on the matters on which we disagree, laboring 
to reconcile the outcomes of scattershot Supreme Court decisions, 
we should look to the elements of the legal system that are 
nonetheless shared and see what they entail. We don’t need to 
construct theories of law to match the Court’s opinions. Instead, 
we can take the opinions as the Court describes them, as fallible 
efforts to implement external standards. Doctrines of precedent, 
like those of waiver or preclusion, might then supply us with 
answers when we disagree about those standards’ content or 
application. Treating precedent as a fallback, rather than the 
system’s foundation, is not only quite useful in practice; it might 
also point the way toward further unity on matters of theory. 
On Kozel’s account, “[d]isagreements over interpretive 
theory are here to stay” (p. 106). If that’s true, and if the best 
anyone can do is to count to five, then we can’t say much about 
the law beyond how it’s practiced on the ground. In such a world, 
Kozel argues, “a change in the composition of the Court is a 
change in the fabric of the law” (p. 103). It’s not merely our 
“perception” (p. 106), but the “reality . . . that constitutional 
change happens through judicial appointments, not formal 
amendments” (p. 17). 
 
 41.  William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1079, 1096 (2017). 
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Yet this picture may be too dark. Despite all our disputes, 
there’s a curious degree of agreement on the “official story”42 of 
the American legal system about what, exactly, precedent is 
supposed to do. The Supreme Court doesn’t take itself to 
establish the law for all time, much less to change the law with 
each new opinion. It agrees that its individual decisions can be 
wrong at the time—legally wrong, and not just proven wrong by 
subsequent events.43 In Lawrence v. Texas,44 for example, the 
Court declared that Bowers v. Hardwick45 “was not correct when 
it was decided,”46 and also that it had been fully “authoritative” 
until its overruling;47 authority as precedent and actual correctness 
were two different things.48 In saying this, the Court was merely 
reflecting the conventional view, as described by Caleb Nelson: 
“[a]ll modern lawyers” would understand a claim that “[t]he 
Constitution plainly establishes Rule X, but the Supreme Court 
has interpreted it to establish Rule Y instead, and the Court is not 
going to overrule that interpretation.”49 
In other words, precedent seems to play a derivative role—
not as a source of constitutional law, but as a proxy or heuristic 
for the law. To both originalists and nonoriginalists alike, 
foundational cases like Marbury or M‘Culloch are “revisitable, at 
least in principle, by the Supreme Court,” in a way that the 
Constitution’s text is not.50 Even those who argue that we’ve 
evolved a common-law constitution—in which precedent, and not 
the text, serves as the primary raw material for interpretation—
 
 42. See Mikolaj Barczentewicz, The Illuminati Problem, Rules of Recognition, and 
What Distinguishes Law from Non-Law?, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 1), http://ssrn.com/id=2915564. 
 43. Cf. Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Truthmakers, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 26–27), http://ssrn.com/id=290
1157 (describing the Court’s own conception of its opinions). 
 44. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 45.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 46. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 47.  Id. at 563. 
 48.  See Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253, 2280–81 (2014) [hereinafter Sachs, Constitution in Exile]. 
 49.  Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 921, 937 (2013). 
 50.  Neil S. Siegel, Jack Balkin’s Rich Historicism and Diet Originalism: Health 
Benefits and Risks for the Constitutional System, 111 MICH. L. REV. 931, 947 (2013) (book 
review). 
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accept that their approach is not one “we usually associate with a 
written constitution, or indeed with codified law of any kind.”51 
To the extent we share a theory of precedent, then, it’s one 
that takes precedent as a useful semblance, and not as the real 
thing. Certainly that’s its role in lower courts; the law of the 
circuit, like the law of the case, stands in for the actual law without 
replacing it.52 When people talk about “the law of the Fourth 
Circuit,” we know what they mean; a district court in Maryland is 
obliged to act as if the Fourth Circuit is always right on the law. 
Yet if someone argued that a federal statute really had different 
legal content in Maryland and in Delaware, we’d call them crazy; 
that’s just not how the American legal system works. 
Because Supreme Court precedent isn’t limited to particular 
parties or a particular geographic circuit, it’s easier to confuse 
“the law of the Supreme Court” with the underlying law.53 But we 
don’t have to think of the Court as the Oracle of One First Street, 
delivering infallible pronouncements from on high. We could 
think of it as a group of fallible human beings who are trying, not 
always successfully, to apply the law to the facts. And we could 
take the precedent it produces the way we say we take it—as 
something explicitly provisional, as the Court’s best guess at the 
law given the time it had and the arguments it heard.54 
If that’s right, it suggests a different way to approach our 
remaining disputes over method. Rather than cautioning the 
Court against “revisiting its constitutional decisions, lest it be 
viewed as announcing the conclusions of five individuals rather 
than the judgment of an enduring institution” (p. 27), we could 
distinguish the fallible conclusions of individuals (today’s or 
yesterday’s) from the judgment of an enduring law. Legal theories 
wouldn’t be expected to “explain the changes that have 
happened” in judicial doctrine55—changes that might themselves 
 
 51.  David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877, 885 (1996). 
 52. Sachs, Finding Law, supra note 9 (manuscript at 41–42). 
 53.  Id. (manuscript at 43). 
 54.  See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1011, 1071 (2003) (noting that the quality of argument can vary across cases); see also 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989) 
(describing an opinion that took “almost three years and seventy pages,” and if “done 
perfectly it might well take thirty years and 7,000 pages”). 
 55.  David A. Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 973, 
976 (2011). 
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result from unrelated contingencies, like shifting political 
coalitions or the untimely resignation of individual Justices.56 
Instead, they would articulate and expound standards for what 
makes doctrinal changes correct, about which there may be rather 
more agreement than we have about the doctrines themselves.57 
Diminishing the status of past decisions, rather than 
committing to leave them in place, might also help avoid the 
confusion sown by arbitrary departures from legal standards, 
whether through faint-heartedness or the occasional “pragmatic 
exception.” Lower-court judges may be obliged to assume that the 
Supreme Court always knows best, and to stare at a pointillist 
mess of precedent until it resolves into a simple picture. Even the 
Justices might sometimes be bound, by common-law rules in place 
from the Founding, to take an inflated opinion of the wisdom of 
their predecessors.58 But we aren’t so bound, and we can accept 
that actual courts will sometimes err. The goal would be a legal 
culture that maintained a healthy skepticism of judges, but a 
healthy confidence in the law—one that truly “reinforc[ed] the 
prevalence of the rule of law over the rule of individual women 
and men” (p. 16). 
In pursuing greater consistency in theory, this strategy 
needn’t tolerate inconsistency on the ground. If Nelson’s account 
is right, stare decisis can lawfully act as a fallback in cases of 
uncertainty—even when the prior precedent is potentially 
mistaken, but not yet “demonstrably erroneous.”59 Not only is this 
fallback theory closer to what the Court already does, but it gets 
us most of the way to the stable and impersonal practice sought 
by Kozel. Where the law is “too vague or ambiguous” (p. 59), or 
“too sparse and abstract” (p. 45), precedent-as-fallback creates “a 
presumption against discarding the accumulated wisdom of past 
generations” (p. 39)—something that can “fill the gaps” and 
“constrain a judge’s discretion where enacted law leaves off” (p. 
43). 
The fallback and second-best theories come apart, though, 
when different Justices rely on different theories, such that each 
finds the other in demonstrable error. To Kozel, this is a 
stalemate: “Fostering agreement around a particular interpretive 
 
 56.  See Sachs, Constitution in Exile, supra note 48, at 2285–86.  
 57. See id. at 2282–84.  
 58.  See Sachs, Backdrops, supra note 28, at 1863–66. 
 59.  Nelson, supra note 27, at 1. 
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methodology is a tall order in our pluralistic legal culture” (p. 
107). Though we might “urge a justice to subordinate her personal 
views” in a particular case, it’s “unreasonable (and unrealistic) to 
request that she adopt, for all intents and purposes, an 
interpretive methodology that is not her own”—to make an 
“extraordinary sacrifice without a sufficient return” (p. 154). Yet 
we ask judges to set aside their personal views all the time, 
whenever we require them to decide in accordance with law. If 
there’s any law on interpretive questions, judges should be 
expected to apply it, no less than they’re expected to apply the tax 
code.60 
Distinguishing precedent from the underlying law—
separating semblance from substance—may help us see our way 
through to these areas of agreement. This process needn’t require 
any individual Justices “to take the dramatic step of disavowing 
their constitutional philosophies” (p. 107). A single Justice’s 
pursuit of the best understanding of the law, like a single Justice’s 
adherence to precedent, is “a means of strengthening a doctrine 
that provides value to the constitutional system more broadly”—
providing an example to others “irrespective of the conduct of 
one’s judicial peers” (pp. 130-131). Besides, constitutional theory 
is a long game: offer a better-grounded theory to the next 
generation, and in a few years the consensus will change. To 
paraphrase Max Planck, maybe constitutional theory, like physics, 
advances one funeral at a time.61 
IV 
At its heart, Settled Versus Right is a case for compromise: a 
generous attempt at peacemaking in not-always-peaceful times. 
At the same time, any argument for compromise—for seeking 
common ground with those who disagree—will always be tested 
by each side’s own lights. One can compromise on significant 
matters to achieve significant gains; yet the compromise still has 
to be, under the circumstances, the right thing for the 
compromiser to do.62 
 
 60. See generally Baude & Sachs, supra note 41. 
 61.  See MAX PLANCK, A Scientific Autobiography, in SCIENTIFIC 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER PAPERS 13, 33–34 (Frank Gaynor trans., Philosophical 
Library 1949) (1948). 
 62.  See David Archard, Moral Compromise, 87 PHIL. 403, 410–11 (2012). 
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As a moral matter, Kozel’s compromise might well be a good 
one. But law, the mere semblance of morality, interposes its own 
rules and may forbid us from taking the deal. However great the 
need for bridges across our legal divides, it may be that no lasting 
structure can be built on what’s merely the semblance of law. 
